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RARE NASH EQUILIBRIA AND THE PRICE OF ANARCHY IN LARGE
STATIC GAMES
DANIEL LACKER AND KAVITA RAMANAN
Abstract. We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are
assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its
objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that depends on its type. The
game is anonymous in the sense that the objective function of each agent depends on the
actions of other agents only through the empirical distribution of their type-action pairs. We
study the asymptotic behavior of Nash equilibria, as the number of agents tends to infinity,
first by deriving laws of large numbers characterizes almost sure limit points of Nash equilibria
in terms of so-called Cournot-Nash equilibria of an associated nonatomic game. Our main
results are large deviation principles that characterize the probability of rare Nash equilibria
and associated conditional limit theorems describing the behavior of equilibria conditioned on a
rare event. The results cover situations when neither the finite-player game nor the associated
nonatomic game has a unique equilibrium. In addition, we study the asymptotic behavior of
the price of anarchy, complementing existing worst-case bounds with new probabilistic bounds
in the context of congestion games, which are used to model traffic routing in networks.
1. Introduction
1.1. Model Description. We consider a static game played by n agents i = 1, . . . , n, in which
the ith agent is assigned a type wi from a type space W, and is allowed to choose an ac-
tion xi from a subset C(wi) of the action space X , so as to minimize its objective function
Jni (w1, . . . , wn, x1, . . . , xn), which can be viewed as a cost. Both W and X are assumed to be
metric spaces, and for w ∈ W, C(w) represents the set of admissible actions allowed for an
agent of type w. We restrict our attention to anonymous games, in which an individual agent’s
objective function is influenced by its own type and action, but depends on the other agents’
types and actions only through the empirical distribution of type-action pairs (rather than on
the full configuration of types and actions of individual agents), and in addition, the form of
this dependence is the same for all agents. More precisely, if we let δ(w,x) denote the Dirac delta
measure at the point (w, x) ∈ W × X , the objective function of the ith agent in the n-player
game takes the form
Jni (w1, . . . , wn, x1, . . . , xn) = F
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ(wk,xk), wi, xi
)
,
for a suitable function F : P(W × X ) × W × X 7→ R, where P(W × X ) is the set of Borel
probability measures on W × X . We are interested in properties of Nash equilibria when the
number of players is large and seek to understand the behavior of agents in terms of their types,
not their names. Here, a Nash equilibrium with type vector ~w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n is any vector
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(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X
n such that for each i, xi lies in the set C(wi) of admissible actions and the
objective function satisfies
Jni (w1, . . . , wn, x1, . . . , xn) = inf
y∈C(wi)
Jni (w1, . . . , wn, x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Note that an agent’s type wi influences not only the objective function but also the set C(wi) of
admissible actions. For simplicity, we work exclusively with pure strategies, although we refer
the interested reader to Blanchet-Carlier [7, Section 4] for extensions of a similar model setup to
cover mixed strategies. For pure strategies, even existence of a Nash equilibrium in an n-player
game is not always guaranteed, but we will be concerned with the large class of games for which
Nash equilibria are known to exist (see Section 2.5). However, such games often admit multiple
equilibria, and so we will in general not assume uniqueness of Nash equilibria.
1.2. Discussion of Results and Related Work. It is in general hard to explicitly identify
the set of Nash equilibria, especially in large games. Thus, we instead study the behavior of
Nash equilibria in the limit as the number of agents goes to infinity. Specifically, under the
assumption that the types of agents in the n-player game are sampled independently from a
common type distribution λ0 ∈ P(W), where P(W) denotes the space of probability measures
onW, the goal of this work is to study the asymptotic behavior of corresponding Nash equilibria
as the number of agents goes to infinity. To emphasize that they are random, we will use capital
letters {Wi} to denote the sequence of i.i.d. types and the array {X
n = (Xn1 , . . . ,X
n
n )} of
associated agent actions in the sequence of n-player games. Under fairly general conditions
(see the standing assumption in Section 2 below), we first state a strong law of large numbers
(Theorem 2.2) that shows that almost sure limit points of sequences of (random) empirical
type-action distributions 1n
∑n
i=1 δ(Wi,Xni ) associated with Nash equilibria can be characterized
as Cournot-Nash equilibria of a certain nonatomic game associated with the type distribution
λ0. When there is a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the nonatomic game, this implies
almost-sure covergence, as n→∞, of the empirical type-action distributions of Nash equilibria
of n-player games to the corresponding Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Our precise framework is related to several existing models in the literature. In particular,
the nonatomic game is similar to the model considered by Blanchet and Carlier [7], which is
itself a reparametrization of the seminal framework of Mas-Colell [30]. The particular definition
that we use (see Section 2.1) is a slight generalization that has two new features. First, it allows
for the incorporation of a constraint map C that specifies the admissible set of actions associated
with each agent type. This extension is necessary to cover interesting examples such as the
class of congestion games described in Section 1.3. Theorem 2.2 is one of many related (and
largely equivalent) laws of large numbers in the literature on large games, notably [21, 23, 13,
24, 7]. Second, our model involves unknown or random types, whereas all of these papers work
with known or deterministic sequences of type vectors (wn1 , . . . , w
n
n) satisfying
1
n
∑n
i=1 δwni →
λ0. Although limited to complete information and homogeneous beliefs, our model setup is
nonetheless also reminiscent of Harsanyi’s formalism of Bayesian games [22].
The primary focus of this work is the estimation of the probability that a Nash equilibrium
of an n-player game makes a large deviation from the law of large numbers limit when n is
large. Our first main set of results, stated in Section 2.2, concern the large deviations behavior
of any sequence of (random) empirical type-action distributions associated with Nash equilibria,
under the assumption that there is a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding
nonatomic game. Specifically, Theorem 2.4 establishes a large deviations principle (LDP) for
such a sequence, which provides precise asymptotic estimates of the exponential rate of decay of
probabilities of the occurrence of rare Nash equilibria (i.e., those that are far from the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium), and the exponential decay rate is expressed in terms of quantities that are
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derived from the more tractable nonatomic game. Establishing an LDP (as opposed to just
obtaining large deviation bounds) sheds light on the behavior of Nash equilibria conditioned on
a rare event, as exemplified by the conditional limit result in Theorem 2.5.
Uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium holds for many nonatomic games, including the
important class of potential games with strictly convex potential. This covers many congestion
games, discussed in more detail in Section 2.5. The foundational work on finite potential games
is [32], but we refer to [9] for interesting developments on potential games for general (possibly
uncountable) type and action spaces. In more recent work [8, 10], Blanchet et al. exploit a
connection with optimal transport to develop methods for computing Cournot-Nash equilibria
even for non-potential games.
However, there are also cases of interest for which the nonatomic game admits multiple
equilibria. To address this situation, in Section 2.3 we also consider the large deviation behavior
of the set of empirical distributions induced by all the Nash equilibria of an n-player game.
We first state an analogous law of large numbers result in Theorem 2.6 that shows convergence
of the sequence of sets of Nash equilibria to the corresponding set of Cournot-Nash equilibria
for the nonatomic game, and then establish a corresponding LDP in Theorem 3.6. The choice
of topology on the space of sets of distributions for this LDP is rather subtle. One needs
to identify a topology that is weak enough for the LDP to hold, but strong enough that the
LDP can provide useful information. We show in Corollary 2.8 that, indeed, our LDP provides
interesting information on the probability of outliers or rare equilibria even in the non-unique
setting. Additionally, as elaborated below, in Section 2.4, we also show that the LDP is useful
for obtaining interesting asymptotic results on the price of anarchy.
Our results appear to be the first LDPs for any kind for large games. Philosophically, the
paper that is closest to ours is that of Menzel [31], which adopts a similar statistical perspective
to large-n asymptotics in order to derive a central limit theorem in addition to a law of large
numbers like Theorem 3.5. Although the model specification in [31] is very different from our
own, Menzel interprets his results as “expansions” of the n-player games around the nonatomic
game “limit”, which is useful because the latter is typically more tractable. Likewise, our results
provide asymptotics for n-player quantities in terms of quantities derived from the associated
nonatomic game, namely, the rate functions in Theorems 2.4 and 2.7). However, rather than
addressing econometric questions as in Menzel, we focus on the probabilistic nature of equilibria
arising from a large number of random types.
Finally, we apply our large deviation analysis to derive high-probability bounds of the so-
called price of anarchy as the number of agents grows. The price of anarchy, a term first
introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [26], is a measure of the degradation of efficiency
in a system due to the selfish behavior of its agents, and it is defined roughly as follows. Given
a type vector ~w ∈ Wn, the socially optimal cost is the least average cost of all players over all
associated admissible type-action pairs, and the price of anarchy of the n-player game is the ratio
of the worst-case (or highest) average cost induced by any Nash equilibrium to the corresponding
socially optimum cost (see Section 2.4 for a precise definition). The price of anarchy measures
the degradation of efficiency in a system due to the selfish behavior of its agents.
1.3. Motivation. The motivation for this study is twofold. Firstly, our results apply to a class
of games introduced by Rosenthal in [34] called congestion games, which have found widespread
application in modeling traffic routing, in both physical and communications networks, par-
ticularly in the field of algorithmic game theory [33]. In the context of traffic modeling, the
congestion game is played on a network, represented by a finite graph, and the type of an agent
is associated with a certain source-destination pair, represented by a pair of vertices in the
graph. The distribution of types could be assumed to be known from historical data. Given a
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realization of these types, the agents of the game can be viewed as drivers who competitively
choose their routes (between their associated source and destination) to minimize travel time,
leading to a corresponding traffic outcome determined by the Nash equilibrium (or the set of
Nash equilibria, when multiple exist).
In managing network traffic, an important quantity is the average travel time (latency) faced
by the agents. A central planner managing the network might prefer to assign to each agent
a socially optimal route, which minimizes the average travel time, but this is rarely feasible.
When agents choose routes selfishly, to minimize their own travel times, the resulting social cost
or average travel time is typically socially suboptimal, and the price of anarchy is a popular
measure of this suboptimality [35]. In Section 2.5, we describe the class of congestion games,
and illustrate how our main results can be used to provide new probabilistic bounds on the
price of anarchy for such games. In particular, Corollary 2.12 shows how to translate a bound
on the price of anarchy in a nonatomic game into a high probability bound on the price of
anarchy in the corresponding finite (but large) game. In particular, our results complement
existing worst-case bounds such as those of Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [15] on the price of
anarchy for n-player congestion games determined by a class of linear cost functions by providing
with-high-probability bounds for the price of anarchy arising from a fixed cost function in that
class.
While we focus on congestion games as a motivating example, our framework encompasses
many different types of large static games appearing in applications, with notable examples
including entry games [5, 11, 4] and auctions [27, 25]. In both of these examples, it is more
natural to interpret agents as maximizing a payoff, which we identify with −F , the negative of
the cost function. A prototypical entry game, borrowed from [5], has X = {0, 1}, an arbitrary
type spaceW, and payoff −F (m,w, x) = x[f(mx{1})+g(w)], for some functions f and g, where
f is decreasing. The action x = 1 means the agent “enters the market.” An agent that does
not enter receives no payoff, while an agent that enters receives a payoff which is decreasing in
the fraction mx{1} of agents that enter. All of our main results apply to entry games, as long
as f and g are continuous. We discuss entry games in somewhat more detail in Section 3.5, as
an illustration of our conditional limit theorem.
On the other hand, our results do not apply to many models of auctions, for which the
payoff function is discontinuous. More specifically, a typical auction model has W = X ⊂
[0,∞) and a payoff function F (m,w, x) with discontinuities at points where x = max supp(mx),
where supp(m) represents the support of the distribution m. For instance, in an auction of
a single unit of a single good, the classical first-price auction has payoff −F (m,w, x) = (w −
x)1{x≥max supp(mx)}, with the type w representing the intrinsic value of the good. That is, when
the bid x of a given agent becomes the maximum bid, the payoff of the agent jumps from zero to
w−x. It is not clear if our main results should still hold in the presence of such discontinuities.
Extending our results to include these other applications would be an interesting problem for
future work.
An additional motivation for our work relates to the study of Nash equilibria in dynamic n-
player games, on which a vibrant literature has emerged recently. These games arise in a variety
of settings and are harder to analyze than static games. Various law of large numbers type
limit theorems and approximation results are now fairly well understood, both in discrete time
[38, 2, 1, 20] and in continuous time [29, 12, 28, 19, 14], and are expressed in terms of associated
dynamic games with a continuum of agents which largely go by the name of mean field games.
The present work grew in part out of early efforts to understand large deviations in dynamic
mean field games, especially in the case when the mean field game admits multiple equilibria. In
many dynamic models, the random variables {Wi} which we called types are better interpreted as
noises. For instance, the continuous time models typically involve controlled diffusion processes
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driven by a sequence {Wi} of i.i.d. Brownian motions. This noise interpretation is equally valid
for the static games of this paper, if we think of Wi as a random shock to agent i. We hope
that our large deviation analysis of static games be useful not only on its own merit but also as
a first step toward understanding large deviations in dynamic games.
2. Statements of Main Results
In this section, we precisely state our results, the proofs of which are presented in Section
3, with some auxiliary results required for the proofs deferred to Appendices A and B. In what
follows, given a metric space S, we let P(S) denote the space of Borel probability measures
on S, equipped with the topology of weak convergence. We will refer to convergence in this
topology as convergence in distribution, and denote this convergence by mn → m, which we
recall means that
∫
ϕdmn →
∫
ϕdm for every bounded continuous function ϕ on S. We will
most often consider the case S = W or S = W × X . Throughout the paper, we make the
following assumptions on the model.
Standing assumptions. The following model parameters are given:
(1) The action space X is a compact metric space.
(2) The type space is a complete separable metric space W.
(3) The constraint map C, which maps elements of W to nonempty closed subsets of X ,
is continuous. Here, continuity of the set-valued map C means both that the graph
Gr(C) = {(w, x) ∈ W ×X : x ∈ C(w)} is closed and that, if wn → w in W and x ∈ C(w),
then there exist nk and xnk ∈ C(wnk) such that xnk → x.
(4) The objective function F : P(W ×X )×W ×X → R is bounded and continuous, where
P(W ×X )×W ×X is equipped with the product topology.
The compactness of X assumed in (1) is important but could likely be replaced by a coercivity
assumption on F . In our main application to congestion games, both sets W and X are finite,
in which case the continuity assumptions (3) and (4) hold automatically. Fix throughout the
paper an arbitrary probability space (Ω,F ,P), and assume it is rich enough to support all of
the random variables of interest. We also assume throughout that for each n ≥ 1 and each type
vector ~w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n, the set of Nash equilibria with type vector ~w is non-empty.
2.1. Nonatomic games and Cournot-Nash equilibria. Let xˆni : W
n 7→ X be measur-
able functions such that (xˆn1 (~w), . . . , xˆ
n
n(~w)) is a Nash equilibrium with type vector ~w, for each
~w ∈ Wn (it is shown in Lemma 3.4 that such a measurable selection always exists under our
assumptions). Now, suppose that W1, . . . ,Wn are the i.i.d. types sampled from a distribution
λ0 ∈ P(W), which we fix once and for all. Let X
n
i = xˆ
n
i (W1, . . . ,Wn) denote the associated
random Nash equilibrium vector. The equilibrium type-action distribution is the random prob-
ability measure (on W ×X ) given by
µn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Wi,Xni ).
Our main results concern the asymptotic behavior of {µn}, which, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, is expressed in terms of equilibria for the corresponding nonatomic game, also called
Cournot-Nash equilibria, defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Cournot-Nash equilibria). For λ ∈ P(W), the set M(λ) of Cournot-Nash
equilibria with type distribution λ is defined as the set of m ∈ P(W × X ) with first marginal
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equal to λ that satisfy
m
{
(w, x) ∈ W ×X : x ∈ C(w), F (m,w, x) = inf
y∈C(w)
F (m,w, y)
}
= 1,
that is, x ∈ C(w) and F (m,w, x) = infy∈C(w) F (m,w, y) hold for m-almost every (w, x).
Intuitively, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium m ∈ M(λ) describes an equilibrium distribution of
type-action pairs in a game consisting of a continuum of infinitesimally small agents. Although,
in an n-player game (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria need not in general exist, a standard argu-
ment in Proposition 3.3 below (adapted from [30]) shows that there always exists a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, i.e., M(λ) 6= ∅ for all λ ∈ P(W).
2.2. Large deviation results for sequences of Nash equilibria. In a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium no individual agent has direct influence on the equilibrium distribution m. Agents thus
optimize independently, facing i.i.d. types, and a law of large numbers heuristic suggests that m
should, in equilibrium, agree with the distribution of type-action pairs. This heuristic is justified
by the following rigorous result:
Theorem 2.2. Given that agent types are i.i.d. with distribution λ0 ∈ P(W), for any metric d on
P(W×X ) compatible with weak convergence, it holds with probability one that d(µn,M(λ0)) :=
supm∈M(λ0) d(µn,m)→ 0.
We prove a somewhat more general form of this result in Section 3 (see Theorem 3.5(ii)
therein), which allows for approximate Nash equilibria and correlated types, although we do not
push this result to the utmost generality because it is not the main novelty of the paper.
Remark 2.3. For an idea of how to adapt Theorem 2.2 to mixed strategies, which we do not
explore in this paper, see [7, Theorem 4.2].
We know from Theorem 2.2 that the limit points of {µn} lie in the set M(λ0). Our first
main result, Theorem 2.4 below, lets us estimate how unlikely it is that µn remains “far” in
some sense from this limiting set. To state the theorem precisely, we introduce some definitions.
Write λ≪ λ0 when λ is absolutely continuous with respect to λ0, and define the relative entropy
as usual by
H(λ|λ0) :=
∫
W
dλ
dλ0
log
dλ
dλ0
dλ, for λ≪ λ0, H(λ|λ0) =∞ otherwise. (2.1)
Define
M =
⋃
λ∈P(W)
M(λ), (2.2)
to be the set of all Cournot-Nash equilibria, with any type distribution. For m ∈ P(W ×X ) let
mw and mx denote the first and second marginals, respectively, of m. Throughout the paper,
we adopt the convention that inf ∅ =∞ and sup ∅ = −∞.
Theorem 2.4. Assume that M(λ) is a singleton for each λ ∈ P(W) with λ ≪ λ0. Then, for
every measurable set A ⊂ P(W ×X ),
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P(µn ∈ A) ≤ − inf
m∈A∩M
H(mw|λ0),
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log P(µn ∈ A) ≥ − inf
m∈A◦∩M
H(mw|λ0),
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where A◦ and A denote the interior and closure, respectively, of A. In other words, {µn} satisfies
an LDP on P(W ×X ) with (good) rate function
m 7→
{
H(mw|λ0) if m ∈ M,
∞ otherwise.
Theorem 2.4 follows from a more general result, Theorem 3.9, proved in Section 3.4. In
applications, one can use Theorem 2.4 to estimate the asymptotic probabilities of what are best
interpreted as rare equilibrium outcomes. Given an event A ⊂ P(W × X ) whose closure is
disjoint from M(λ0), for example, A = {m ∈ P(W ×X ) : d(m,M(λ0)) ≥ ǫ}, Theorem 2.2 says
that P(µn ∈ A)→ 0, and Theorem 2.4 says that this happens exponentially quickly, making the
event rare in the sense that roughly P(µn ∈ A) ≈ e
−ncA for a constant cA > 0. Indeed, it is easy
to show (see Lemma 3.12 below) that cA := infm∈A∩MH(m
w|λ0) > 0 for the particular set A
chosen above, so that the upper bound of Theorem 2.4 is nontrivial.
For a more tangible application, for a closed set B ⊂ X we can estimate the probability
P (Xni ∈ B for some i) = P (supp(µ
w
n ) ∩B 6= ∅) ,
that the action of some agent belongs to the set B; here supp(m) denotes the support of a
measure m. For instance, in a traffic congestion game, this event could represent some agent
utilizing a seemingly inefficient or slow route. This event is “rare” as long as B does not
intersect the support of mx0 where m0 is the unique element of M(λ0). Again, by “rare” we
mean inf{H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ M, supp(m
x) ∩ B 6= ∅} > 0, so that the upper bound of Theorem
2.4 is nontrivial.
Theorem 2.4 is of course related to Sanov’s theorem and indeed reduces to it in degenerate
cases (e.g., when X is a singleton). Our framework also admits an analog of Crame´r’s theorem:
If X is a subset of a Euclidean space, then we can estimate probabilities involving the average
of agents’ actions, such as P( 1n
∑n
i=1X
n
i ∈ B) for B ⊂ X .
A full LDP, which explicitly characterizes asymptotic large deviation upper and lower bounds
provides information [about the system] that cannot be obtained by just one-sided bounds.
Specifically, in the spirit of the so-called Gibbs conditioning principle (see, for instance, [16, 17]),
the LDP of Theorem 2.4 can be used to derive the following conditional limit theorem, which
tells us about the typical behavior of µn given that a rare event of the form {µn ∈ A} occurs:
Theorem 2.5. Let A ⊂ P(W ×X ) be measurable and define
I(A) := inf
{
H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, A ∩M(λ) 6= ∅
}
, (2.3)
S(A) :=
{
m ∈ A ∩M : H(mw|λ0) = I(A)
}
. (2.4)
Suppose I(A) <∞. Then S(A) is nonempty and compact. Assume that
I(A) = inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, M(λ) ⊂ A
◦} , (2.5)
and also that P(µn ∈ A) is nonzero for all sufficiently large n. Then, letting d denote any metric
on P(W ×X ) compatible with weak convergence, for each ǫ > 0 there exists c > 0 such that, for
all sufficiently large n,
P (d(µn, S(A)) ≥ ǫ|µn ∈ A) ≤ e
−cn. (2.6)
In particular, every limit point of the sequence of conditional distributions of µn given {µn ∈ A},
n ∈ N, is supported on the set S(A). If S(A) = {ν} is a singleton, then these conditional
distributions converge to the point mass at ν. Finally, if M(λ) is a singleton for every λ≪ λ0,
then in fact (2.5) is equivalent to the following condition:
I(A) = inf
m∈A∩M
H(mw|λ0) = inf
m∈A◦∩M
H(mw|λ0). (2.7)
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The proof of this conditional limit theorem is given in Section 3.5. The challenge in applying
Theorem 2.5 lies in checking the assumption (2.5), or equivalently (2.7) when there is uniqueness,
and also showing that the set S(A) of (2.4) is a singleton. The key difficulty is that the setM is
never convex in nontrivial cases, which makes the minimization problems in (2.7) more difficult
than those that arise from the usual Gibbs conditioning principle. However, these assumptions
can be verified in several cases of interest. As an illustration, in Section 3.5 we discuss in detail
a simple example of an entry game in which both assumptions can be verified.
Theorem 2.4 applies to a given sequence (more precisely, triangular array) of Nash equilib-
ria {Xni , 1 ≤ i ≤ n}n∈N, under a crucial uniqueness assumption. Notice that the uniqueness
assumption is imposed only at the limit, for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and no uniqueness
is required of the equilibria of n-player games. It is evident that some kind of uniqueness as-
sumption at the limit is necessary. Suppose, for instance, that X contains at least two elements,
that C(w) = X for all w, and that the cost function is the trivial F ≡ 0. Then there is no hope
for an LDP because any choice of actions is a Nash equilibrium. Uniqueness is known to hold
in various particular models as well as for a broad class of games known as potential games,
at least when the potential is strictly convex, and we will encounter a class of examples in our
discussion of congestion games in Section 2.5. Nonetheless, uniqueness is not to be expected in
general.
2.3. Large deviation results for the set of equilibria. We now address the case when there
are multiple Cournot-Nash equilibria for the limiting nonatomic game. Let N̂n :W
n → 2P(W×X )
denote the set-valued map that assigns to each type vector the corresponding set of equilibrium
type-action distributions:
N̂n(w1, . . . , wn) :=
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(wi,xi) : (x1, . . . , xn) is Nash for types (w1, . . . , wn)
}
. (2.8)
Again, let {Wi} be a sequence of i.i.d. W-valued random variables with distribution λ0, and let
Nn = N̂n(W1, . . . ,Wn) denote the random set of equilibrium type-action distributions.
It is shown in Proposition 3.2 that N̂n(~w) and M(λ) are always closed sets. Thus, in the
following theorem, we topologize the space C of closed subsets of P(W × X ) with the upper
Vietoris topology, generated by the base of open sets of the form {A ∈ C : A ⊂ E}, where E is
an open subset of P(W×X ). See Appendix A for a short discussion of the basic properties of this
topology, the most important of which is that it topologizes upper hemicontinuity of set-valued
maps. First, Theorem 2.6 states that Nn converges almost surely to M(λ0), thus establishing a
law-of-large numbers result in the upper Vietoris topology, which we prove in Section 3.3.
Theorem 2.6. The sequence of random sets {Nn} converges almost surely to M(λ0).
The next main result is an LDP for the set of Nash equilibria. This not only does away with
the uniqueness assumption on Cournot-Nash equilibria imposed in Theorem 2.4, but it carries
more information than Theorem 2.4 even when there is uniqueness. As shown in Remark 3.7,
Theorem 2.7 follows from a more general result, Theorem 3.6, established in Section 3.4.
Theorem 2.7. For Borel sets U ⊂ C,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P(Nn ∈ U) ≤ − inf{H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ∈ U},
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log P(Nn ∈ U) ≥ − inf{H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ∈ U
◦}.
In other words, {Nn} satisfies an LDP on C with (good) rate function
A 7→ inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) = A} . (2.9)
RARE EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE GAMES 9
At first, this theorem may appear too abstract to be useful, especially given that the upper
Vietoris topology is rather coarse (even non-Hausdorff). On the contrary, it yields several
interesting concrete results, a key example of which stems from the following simple corollary.
Corollary 2.8. If E ⊂ P(W ×X ) is closed, then
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P (Nn ∩E 6= ∅) ≤ − inf {H(m
w|λ0) : m ∈ M∩ E} . (2.10)
If E is open, then
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP (Nn ⊂ E) ≥ − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), Mλ ⊂ E} .
Corollary 2.8 can be interpreted in terms of outliers, or rare equilibria. Indeed, the left-hand
side of (2.10) is the probability that there exists a Nash equilibrium for the n-player game that
lies in the set E. If M(λ0) ∩ E = ∅, we know from Theorem 2.2 that equilibria in E should be
rare when n is large in the sense that P(Nn ∩ E 6= ∅) → 0. The bound (2.10) shows that this
probability decays exponentially and quantifies precisely the exponential decay rate. The proofs
of the large deviations results in Theorem 2.7 can be found in Section 3.4 (see Theorem 3.6)
and hinge on the well-known contraction principle, once the n-player games and the nonatomic
game are set on a common topological space (as in Section 3.1).
It should also be mentioned that a map of the form C ∋ A 7→ G(A) := supm∈A g(m) ∈ R
is upper semicontinuous whenever g is upper semicontinuous. If g is continuous, and if it is
constant on a set A, then G is continuous at A. These facts (proven in Lemma A.2) can be used
to derive large deviation bounds for a sequence of random variables of the form supm∈Nn g(m),
which we interpret as the worst case value of g, in equilibrium. The following section investigates
a somewhat more complex instance of this observation.
2.4. Price of anarchy. We now provide a precise definition of the price of anarchy for both
n-player and nonatomic games. We assume that F ≥ 0, which is essentially without loss of
generality due to the boundedness assumption (4). For each n and each type vector ~w =
(w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n, define the set of all admissible type-action distributions by
Ân(w1, . . . , wn) :=
{
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ(wk ,xk) : xi ∈ C(wi), i = 1, . . . , n
}
. (2.11)
The average cost of the game, for a fixed type-action distribution m ∈ P(W ×X ), is defined by
V (m) :=
∫
W×X
F (m,w, x)m(dw, dx). (2.12)
Finally the price of anarchy is the ratio of the worst-case Nash equilibrium cost to the socially
optimal cost, or
PoAn(~w) :=
sup
m∈N̂n(~w)
V (m)
inf
m∈Ân(~w)
V (m)
,
where recall the definition of N̂n from (2.8). Recall that N̂n(~w), and thus Ân(~w), is non-empty
due to our standing assumption on the existence of Nash equilibria for n-player games. Assume
that V is strictly positive, which by continuity implies that V is bounded from below away
from zero on the non-empty compact set Ân(~w), for each fixed n and ~w ∈ W
n. Moreover, V
is bounded since F is bounded by our standing assumption (4). Thus, the numerator above is
also a finite positive number. Hence, PoAn(~w) is well defined.
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Finally, define the price of anarchy for the nonatomic game as follows. For λ ∈ P(W), set
A(λ) := {m ∈ P(W ×X ) : mw = λ, m{(w, x) : x ∈ C(w)} = 1} . (2.13)
This is simply the set of all admissible type-action distributions for the nonatomic game with
type distribution λ. The price of anarchy is then
PoA(λ) :=
supm∈M(λ) V (m)
infm∈A(λ) V (m)
.
Under our standing assumptions, V is bounded above and by Proposition 3.3, M(λ) 6= ∅ for
each fixed λ ∈ P(W). Again, if V > 0 pointwise then by continuity V is bounded from below
away from zero on the non-empty compact set A(λ), for each fixed λ ∈ P(W), and PoA(λ) is
well defined. As before, let {Wi} be i.i.d. W-valued random variables with distribution λ0. See
Section 3.6 for the proof of the following:
Proposition 2.9. Assume V > 0 pointwise. It holds almost surely that
lim sup
n→∞
PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) ≤ PoA(λ0).
Moreover,1 for each r,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logP(PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) ≥ r) ≤ − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), PoA(λ) ≥ r} ,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP(PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) < r) ≥ − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), PoA(λ) < r} .
2.5. Congestion games. We now introduce the class of congestion games alluded to in Section
1.3. To specify the model, we work with a finite setW of types. Given a finite set E of elements,
the action space is the set X = 2E\{∅} of nonempty subsets. The constraint map C is arbitrary
for the moment. A continuous increasing function ce : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is given for each e ∈ E,
which represents the cost faced by an agent when using element e, as a function of the current
load or congestion on that element. The cost function F is defined by
F (m,w, x) :=
∑
e∈x
ce (ℓe(m)) , where ℓe(m) := m{(w, x) ∈ W ×X : e ∈ x}. (2.14)
Here ℓe(m) is the load on the edge e imposed by the type-action distribution m, which is defined
as the fraction of agents using the element e. The cost on a route is additive along edges, and
the cost at each edge depends on the corresponding load. Notice that the type does not enter
explicitly into F , and its only role is to govern the constraints.
A typical class of examples, representing a traffic network congestion game, originating with
the seminal work of Wardrop [37], is as follows. The set E is the set of edges of some (directed)
graph (V,E), so that an action x ∈ X is a set of edges. The type space W is a subset of V 2,
so that the type w = (i, j) of an agent represents the source i and the destination j of this
agent. The constraint set C(w) is the set of all (Hamiltonian) paths connecting the source i to
the destination j, for w = (i, j).
1Equivalently, PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) satisfies an LDP on (R ∪ {−∞}, τ ) with good rate function r 7→
inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), PoA(λ) = r}, where τ = {[−∞, a) : a ∈ R ∪ {−∞}} is the lower topology.
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2.5.1. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Congestion games are well known to belong to
the class of potential games [32], for which (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria always exist, and for
which the uniqueness assumption of Theorem 2.4 can be established simply by proving a certain
function is strictly convex. Consider the function U : P(W ×X )→ R given by
U(m) =
∑
e∈E
∫ ℓe(m)
0
ce(s) ds. (2.15)
Because ce ≥ 0 is increasing, the function t 7→
∫ t
0 ce(s) ds is convex, and thus U is itself convex.
Moreover, recalling the definition of A(λ) from (2.13), it can be shown that for each λ ∈ P(W)
the set of minimizers of U on the set A(λ) is preciselyM(λ), the set of Cournot-Nash equilibria
with type distribution λ. Hence, when U is strictly convex, the set M(λ) is a singleton for
every λ. The following two propositions justify and elaborate on these claims. At least the first
of the two is well known, but we provide the short proofs in Appendix B to keep the paper
self-contained. In the following, |E| denotes the cardinality of a set E and for a statement H,
1H is 1 if the statement H holds and is zero otherwise.
Proposition 2.10. Fix λ ∈ P(W). Then m minimizes U(·) on A(λ) if and only if m ∈ M(λ).
The final proposition, regarding uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, is likely sub-
optimal but is merely meant to illustrate that uniqueness is not an unreasonable request of a
congestion game:
Proposition 2.11. Enumerate W = {w1, . . . , w|W|} and X = {x1, . . . , x|X |}. Let T denote the
space of |W| × |X | stochastic matrices, i.e., matrices with nonnegative entries whose columns
sum to one. Assume ce is differentiable with a strictly positive derivative. Suppose λ ∈ P(W)
is such that the span of {(λ{wi}1{e∈xj})i,j : e ∈ E} contains T. Then U has a unique minimizer
on A(λ).
2.5.2. Price of anarchy. There is a rich literature on worst-case bounds, which are typically
valid for a large class of cost functions and model specifications. For instance, for the class of
linear cost functions, the seminal paper of Roughgarden and Tardos [35, Theorem 4.5] provides
a worst-case bound of 4/3 for the PoA in nonatomic games. More precisely, if ce is linear for
each e, then PoA(λ) ≤ 4/3 for all λ ∈ P(W). On the other hand, for finite games with linear
cost functions, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias showed in [15, Theorem 1] that the worst-case
bound on the PoA is 5/2. That is, if ce is linear for each e, then PoAn(~w) ≤ 5/2 for all n and
all ~w ∈ Wn. These PoA bounds are sharp in the sense that there exist linear cost functions and
type distributions for which the bound holds with equality. Nonetheless, the following result
asserts that for a fixed choice of linear cost functions {ce}e∈E , the probability of the PoA in the
n-player exceeding 4/3 decays super-exponentially in n.
Corollary 2.12. In the congestion game model described above, let R = supλ≪λ0 PoA(λ), and
assume that for each w ∈ W and every x ∈ C(w) there exists e ∈ x such that ce(t) > 0 for all
t > 0. Suppose {Wi} is an i.i.d. sequence of types with distribution λ0. Then, for every ǫ > 0
and c > 0, there exists N such that, for all n ≥ N ,
P (PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) ≥ R+ ǫ) ≤ e
−cn.
Remark 2.13. The assumption in Corollary 2.12 is not very restrictive; it means that if an
admissible route for a given agent has a nonzero load on every edge, then the route has nonzero
travel time. This holds, for instance, if ce(t) > 0 for all t > 0 and for all e ∈ E.
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Proof of Corollary 2.12. In this model, since W and X are finite, using (2.12) and (2.14), for
any m ∈ P(W ×X ) we can write
V (m) =
∑
w∈W
∑
x∈C(w)
m{(w, x)}
∑
e∈x
ce(ℓe(m)).
Choose w ∈ W and x ∈ C(w) such that m{(w, x)} > 0. By assumption, we may find e ∈ x such
that ce(t) > 0 for all t > 0. Then
ℓe(m) =
∑
w′∈W
∑
x′∈C(w′)
1e∈x′m{(w
′, x′)} ≥ 1e∈xm{(w, x)} > 0,
which implies
V (m) ≥ m{(w, x)}ce(ℓe(m)) > 0.
We are now in a position to apply Proposition 2.9. Because inf ∅ =∞ by convention,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logP (PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) ≥ R+ ǫ)
≤ − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, PoA(λ) ≥ R+ ǫ}
= −∞.

As discussed above, Roughgarden and Tardos showed that the constant R of Corollary 2.12
is at most 4/3 when ce is linear for each e. Even though the finite n-player game worst-case
PoAn bound of 5/2 is optimal among the class of linear cost functions, our results show that for
large n, it is highly unlikely for any fixed collection of linear cost functions {ce}e∈E to produce
a PoA over 4/3 when sampling i.i.d. random types. More generally, Corollary 2.12 produces a
high-probability PoA bound for a large but finite population game from a PoA bound for the
corresponding class of nonatomic congestion games.
3. Extensions and proofs of main results
We begin our analysis in Section 3.1 by embedding the n-player games and the associated
nonatomic game on a common space, inspired by a construction of Housman [23]. Then, in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we prove, respectively, the law of large numbers and large deviation results.
Finally, we prove the conditional limit theorem in Section 3.5 and our results on the price of
anarchy in Section 3.6.
3.1. A common embedding of n-player and nonatomic games. Let Gr(C) denote the
graph of the constraint set-valued map C:
Gr(C) = {(w, x) ∈ W ×X : x ∈ C(w)}.
We wish to define an equilibrium map N = N (λ, ǫ, u), which maps certain elements of P(W)×
[0,∞) × [0, 1] to subsets of P(W × X ). The first input parameter, λ ∈ P(W), denotes the
distribution of types, while the parameter ǫ ∈ [0,∞) signifies that we are interested in ǫ-Nash
equilibria (defined precisely in Remark 3.1(4) below). Finally, the parameter u ∈ [0, 1] is inter-
preted as the size (or degree of influence) of an agent. We are only interested in sizes belonging
to N
−1
:= {1/n : n = 1, 2, . . .}∪{0}. When the size is 1/n we are only interested in discrete prob-
ability distributions of the form m = 1n
∑n
i=1 δ(wi,xi), where (wi, xi) ∈ Gr(C), i = 1, . . . , n. Thus,
the domain of the map N is a certain subset of P(W)× [0,∞)× [0, 1], whose definition requires
the following notation. For any set S, and positive integer n, let E1/n(S) := {
1
n
∑n
i=1 δei : ei ∈ S}
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denote the set of empirical distributions of n points in S. When S is a metric space, the con-
vention E0(S) := P(S) will be useful as well, where as usual, P(S) is the set of Borel probability
measures on S. Define D(N ) to be the set of (λ, ǫ, u) ∈ P(W)× [0,∞)× [0, 1] such that u ∈ N
−1
and λ ∈ Eu(W). That is,
D(N ) :=
⋃
u∈N
−1
(Eu(W)× [0,∞) × {u}) (3.1)
Next, define a real-valued function G by
G(m,u,w, x) := F (m,w, x) − inf
y∈C(w)
F
(
m+ u(δ(w,y) − δ(w,x)), w, y
)
, (3.2)
for ((m,u), w, x) in D ×W ×X , where
D :=
⋃
u∈N
−1
(Eu(W ×X )× {u}) . (3.3)
Finally, define the equilibrium map N on D(N ) by
N (λ, ǫ, u) = {m ∈ Eu(W ×X ) : m(Gr(C)) = 1, m
w = λ, G(m,u,w, x) ≤ ǫ for m-a.e. (w, x)} .
(3.4)
Remark 3.1. Several comments are in order here.
(1) N (λ, 0, 0) is precisely the setM(λ) of Cournot-Nash equilibria; here the “error” parame-
ter ǫ and the “size” parameter u are both zero, which means that E0(W×X ) = P(W×X )
contains all probability distributions on W ×X .
(2) When u = 1/n > 0 for some positive integer n, there are n agents, each of “size” 1/n,
and N (λ, ǫ, u) is a subset of Eu(W×X ), the empirical distributions of n points inW×X .
(3) The term u(δ(w,y) − δ(w,x)) appearing in F in the definition (3.2) of G accounts for the
effect on the distribution m of agents when an agent of size u changes its strategy.
(4) If (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n is a type vector for the n-player game, it is straightforward to see
that N
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δwi , ǫ, 1/n
)
is precisely the set of empirical distributions 1n
∑n
i=1 δ(wi,xi),
where (x1, . . . , xn) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with type vector (w1, . . . , wn), in the sense
that G( 1n
∑n
i=1 δ(wi,xi), 1/n,wi, xi) ≤ ǫ for every i. Most importantly, recalling the defi-
nition of N̂n(w1, . . . , wn) from (2.8), we have
N
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δwi , 0,
1
n
)
= N̂n(w1, . . . , wn).
The key result of this section, inspired by [23], is that the map N is upper hemicontinuous,
a crucial property that is used in the proofs of most of the main results. Let us first recall
some basic definitions regarding set-valued functions. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and
let Γ : X → 2Y map points in X to subsets of Y . We say that the set-valued map Γ is upper
hemicontinuous if {x ∈ X : Γ(x) ⊂ A} is open in X for every open set A ⊂ Y , and we say
that Γ is lower hemicontinuous if {x ∈ X : Γ(x) ∩ A 6= ∅} is open in X for every open set
A ⊂ Y . Say that Γ is continuous if it is both upper and lower hemicontinuous. If Y is compact
Hausdorff, and if Γ(x) is closed for each x, then Γ is upper hemicontinuous if and only if its
graph Gr(Γ) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ Γ(x)} is closed [3, Theorem 17.11]. On the other hand,
if X and Y are metric spaces, there is a useful sequential characterization (c.f. Theorems 17.16
and 17.19 of [3]): first, Γ is lower hemicontinuous if and only if, whenever xn → x in X and
y ∈ Γ(x), there exist integers 1 ≤ n1 < n2 < . . . and ynk ∈ Γ(xnk) such that ynk → y. Second, a
map Γ with compact values is upper hemicontinuous if and only if, whenever xn → x in X and
yn ∈ Γ(xn) for all n, the sequence {yn} is precompact, and every limit point belongs to Γ(x).
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Proposition 3.2. The sets D(N ) and D in (3.1) and (3.3) are closed. The set-valued map N
in (3.4) is upper hemicontinuous on D(N ) with compact values, and the function G in (3.2) is
continuous. In particular, N (λ, 0, 0) =M(λ) is closed for all λ ∈ P(W).
Proof. Let (λn, ǫn, un) ∈ D(N ) and (λ∞, ǫ∞, u∞) ∈ P(W) × [0,∞) × [0, 1] with (λn, ǫn, un) →
(λ∞, ǫ∞, u∞). If u∞ = 0, then trivially λ∞ ∈ E0(W) = P(W), and so (λ∞, ǫ∞, u∞) ∈ D(N ). If
u∞ 6= 0, then there exists N such that u∞ = un = u for all n ≥ N . But then λn belongs to the
closed set Eu∞(W) for all n ≥ N , and thus so does λ∞. Moreover, by definition ǫ∞ ∈ [0,∞).
This shows that D(N ) is closed, and the same argument shows that D is closed.
To show that N is upper hemicontinuous, we use the sequential characterization described
above. Let (λn, ǫn, un) ∈ D(N ) with (λn, ǫn, un) → (λ∞, ǫ∞, u∞), and let mn ∈ N (λn, ǫn, un)
for every n. First, note that mwn = λn for each n, which implies that {m
w
n } ⊂ P(W) is tight by
Prokhorov’s theorem and our standing assumption (2) that W is a complete separable metric
space. Because X is compact, {mxn} ⊂ P(X ) is also tight. Thus {mn} ⊂ P(W × X ) is tight,
and by Prokhorov’s theorem it admits a subsequential limit point m∞. It remains to show that
m∞ ∈ N (λ∞, ǫ∞, u∞).
We will abuse notation somewhat by assuming mn → m∞. Because mn(Gr(C)) = 1 for each
n and Gr(C) is closed, the Portmanteau theorem yields m∞(Gr(C)) = 1. It is clear also that
λ∞ = lim
n→∞
λn = lim
n→∞
mwn = m
w
∞,
where the limits are in the sense of weak convergence. The continuity of F and C of standing
assumptions (3-4) implies the continuity of G by Berge’s theorem [3, Theorem 17.31]. Define
measures ηn on D ×W ×X by
ηn(dm, du, dw, dx) = δ(mn,un)(dm, du)mn(dw, dx).
Then ηn → η∞ because (mn, un) → (m∞, u∞), and it follows from the Portmanteau theorem
that for any ∆ > 0,
m∞ {(w, x) : G(m∞, u∞, w, x) ≤ ǫ∞ +∆} = η∞ {(m,u,w, x) : G(m,u,w, x) ≤ ǫ∞ +∆}
≥ lim sup
n→∞
ηn {(m,u,w, x) : G(m,u,w, x) ≤ ǫ∞ +∆}
= lim sup
n→∞
mn {(w, x) : G(mn, un, w, x) ≤ ǫ∞ +∆}
≥ lim sup
n→∞
mn {(w, x) : G(mn, un, w, x) ≤ ǫn}
= 1,
where the last inequality uses the fact that, since ǫn → ǫ∞, ǫn ≤ ǫ∞+∆ for all sufficiently large n,
and the last equality holds because mn ∈ N (λn, ǫn, un). Since ∆ > 0 is arbitrary, it follows that
G(m∞, u∞, w, x) ≤ ǫ∞ for m∞ a.e. (w, x). It remains to check that m∞ belongs to Eu∞(W×X ).
If u∞ = 0, there is nothing to prove because of the convention E0(W × X ) = P(W × X ). If
u∞ > 0, then there exists N such that un = u∞ for all n ≥ N . Then mn belongs to the closed
set Eu∞(W ×X ) for all n ≥ N , and hence, so does m∞. 
3.2. Existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria. Under our standing assumptions, there always
exist Cournot-Nash equilibria for the nonatomic game. The proof uses a simple argument due
to Mas-Colell [30], appropriately modified to incorporate the constraint map C.
Proposition 3.3. For each λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let Gr(C) = {(w, x) ∈ W × X : x ∈ C(w)} as before, and define A(λ) as in (2.13).
Note that A(λ) is closed, as Gr(C) is closed by our standing assumption (3). Because X is
compact and W × X is a complete separable metric space by our standing assumptions (1-2),
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it is straightforward to check that A(λ) is tight and thus compact. Consider the map Φ from
A(λ) into subsets of A(λ), given by
Φ(m) =
{
m˜ ∈ A(λ) :
∫
W×X
G(m, 0, w, x)m˜(dw, dx) ≤ 0
}
for m ∈ A(λ). Note that m ∈ P(W ×X ) is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with type distribution
λ if and only if m ∈ Φ(m), i.e., m is a fixed point of Φ. Clearly A(λ) is convex, and hence
Φ(m) is convex for each m. The graph Gr(Φ) = {(m, m˜) ∈ A(λ) ×A(λ) : m˜ ∈ Φ(m)} is easily
seen to be closed, using the fact that G is continuous (due to Proposition 3.2) and bounded (by
standing assumption (4)). To check that Φ(m) is nonempty for each m, note that there exists
(e.g., by [3, Theorem 18.19]) a measurable function xˆ : A(λ)×W → X such that xˆ(m,w) ∈ C(w)
and F (m,w, xˆ(m,w)) = infy∈C(w) F (m,w, y) for each (m,w) ∈ A(λ) ×W. Then mˆ(dw, dx) =
λ(dw)δxˆ(m,w)(dx) always belongs to Φ(m). Because Φ has a closed graph and nonempty convex
values, it admits a fixed point by Kakutani’s theorem [3, Corollary 17.55]. 
3.3. Proof of laws of large numbers. Using Proposition 3.2, we give streamlined proofs of
Theorems 2.6 and 2.2, and even an extension of the latter.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Proposition 3.2 shows that N is upper hemicontinuous. According to
Lemma A.1, this implies that N is continuous as a map from D(N ) to the space C of closed
subsets of P(W×X ) endowed with the upper Vietoris topology. Because ( 1nδWi , 0,
1
n) converges
almost surely to (λ0, 0, 0), it follows (see Remark 3.1(4) for the first equality) that, almost surely,
N̂n(W1, . . . ,Wn) = N
(
1
n
δWi , 0,
1
n
)
→ N (λ0, 0, 0) =M(λ0).

We next turn to the proof of Theorem 2.2, which we precede with a reassuring technical
lemma. First, for ǫ ≥ 0 and n ∈ N, let N ǫn(~w) denote the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria with type
vector ~w ∈ Wn. By Remark 3.1(4), this can be expressed in terms of the function G of (3.2) as
N ǫn(w1, . . . , wn) =
{
~x ∈ X n : xi ∈ C(wi) and G
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(wi,xi),
1
n
,wi, xi
)
≤ ǫ, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Also, let Dǫn be the set of ~w ∈ W
n for which there exists an associated ǫ-Nash equilibrium:
Dǫn = {~w ∈ W
n : N ǫn(~w) 6= ∅} .
Lemma 3.4. For each n and ǫ ≥ 0, the set Dǫn is closed. Moreover, there exists a universally
measurable map xˆ : Dǫn → X
n such that xˆ(~w) ∈ N ǫn(~w) for each ~w ∈ D
ǫ
n.
Proof. Continuity of G (proven in Proposition 3.2) and closedness of the graph of C (one of our
standing assumptions) together imply that the graph
Gr(N ǫn) = {(~w, ~x) ∈ W
n × X n : ~x ∈ N ǫn(~w)}
is closed. The projection fromW×X toW is a closed map, since X is compact, which shows that
Dǫn is closed. The existence of xˆ follows from the Jankov-von Neumann theorem [6, Proposition
7.49]. 
Theorem 3.5. Let ǫn ≥ 0 be such that ǫn → 0. Suppose, for each n and each ~w ∈ W
n, we are
given an ǫn-Nash equilibrium xˆ
n(~w) = (xˆn1 (~w), . . . , xˆ
n
n(~w)) with type vector ~w. By Lemma 3.4
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we may assume each xˆni is universally measurable. Finally, suppose
~W n = (W n1 , . . . ,W
n
n ) is a
Wn-valued random vector, and define the random empirical distributions
µn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(Wni ,xˆni ( ~Wn))
, µwn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWni .
Then the following hold:
(i) If the sequence {µwn } is tight, then so is the sequence {µn}, and every subsequential limit
in distribution µ of {µn} satisfies µ ∈M(µ
w), almost surely.
(ii) If µwn → λ0 in distribution, where λ0 ∈ P(W) is deterministic, then every subsequential
limit in distribution of {µn} is supported on M(λ0). In particular,
lim
n→∞
P(d(µn,M(λ0)) ≥ ǫ) = 0, (3.5)
for every ǫ > 0, and any metric d on P(W ×X ) compatible with weak convergence.
(iii) If W n1 , . . . ,W
n
n are i.i.d. with distribution λ0 ∈ P(W), for each n, then d(µn,M(λ0))→ 0
almost surely, for d as in (ii).
Proof.
(i) By [36, Proposition 2.2(ii)], tightness of {P◦(µwn )
−1} ⊂ P(P(W)) is equivalent to tightness
of the sequence of mean measures {E[µwn ]} ⊂ P(W), where E[µ
w
n ](·) := E[µ
w
n (·)]. The
mean measure E[µn] has first marginal E[µ
w
n ], and because X is compact we conclude that
{E[µn]} ⊂ P(W × X ) is tight. Again using [36, Proposition 2.2(ii)], we conclude that
{P ◦ µ−1n } ⊂ P(P(W ×X )) is tight. Now, by Skorohod’s representation theorem, we may
assume that (along a subsequence) µn converges almost surely to a random element µ of
P(W×X ). This implies µwn → µ
w a.s. Since µn ∈ N (µ
w
n , ǫn, 1/n) by assumption, the upper
hemicontinuity of N implies that a.s., µ must belong to N (µw, 0, 0) =M(µw), where the
last equality holds by Remark 3.1(1).
(ii) Suppose the random measure µ is a subsequential limit in distribution of {µn}. Because
µwn → λ0, we must have µ
w = λ0 a.s. We conclude from (i) that P(µ ∈ M(λ0)) = 1. Thus,
for any subsequential limit µ of {µn} and ǫ > 0, we have P(d(µ,M(λ0)) ≥ ǫ) = 0. When
combined with the Portmanteau theorem, the closedness of the set M(λ0) established in
Proposition 3.2 and the consequent closedness of {m ∈ P(W × X ) : d(m,M(λ0)) ≥ ǫ}
imply the claim (3.5).
(iii) Almost surely, the following holds: Because µwn → λ0 due to {W
n
i } being i.i.d., and µn ∈
N (µwn , ǫn, 1/n), upper hemicontinuity of N implies that that the limit limk→∞ µnk exists
along some subsequence, and every such limit belongs to N (λ0, 0, 0). By Remark 3.1(1),
this is enough to show d(µn,M(λ0))→ 0.

3.4. Proofs of large deviation results. We are now prepared to state and prove an extension
of our main result (Theorem 2.7) that allows for approximate equilibria. Recall from Section
2.3 the definition of the space C, equipped with the upper Vietoris topology. Having identified
the suitable space, topology and mappings, the proof of this extension follows from a simple
application of the contraction principle from large deviations theory. As we will use it on several
occasions, it is worth recalling here the general definition of an LDP. We say that a sequence
of Borel probability measures {νn} on a topological space S satisfies an LDP with good rate
function I : S → [0,∞] if the level set {s ∈ S : I(s) ≤ c} is compact for each c ≥ 0 and if the
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following holds for every Borel set A ⊂ S:
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log νn(A) ≤ − inf
s∈A
I(s),
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log νn(A) ≥ − inf
s∈A◦
I(s),
where A and A◦ denote the closure and interior. We say a sequence of S-valued random variables
satisfies an LDP if the corresponding sequence of probability measures does. In the following,
recall the definition of the relative entropy H from (2.1).
Theorem 3.6. Suppose ǫn → 0 and {Wi} is an i.i.d. sequence of W-valued random variables
with common type distribution λ0. Then the sequence of sets of ǫn-Nash equilibria
N
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
, n ∈ N,
satisfies an LDP on C with good rate function
J(A) = inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) = A} . (3.6)
Proof. First recall from Proposition 3.2 that N (λ, ǫ, u) is closed and thus belongs to C, for every
(λ, ǫ, u) ∈ D(N ). Define two D(N )-valued random variables
Mn =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
, M0n =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , 0, 0
)
.
By Sanov’s theorem and the contraction principle [17, Theorem 4.2.1], applied to the continuous
map P(W) ∋ λ 7→ (λ, 0, 0) ∈ P(W)× [0,∞)× [0, 1], {M0n} satisfies an LDP on P(W)× [0,∞)×
[0, 1] with good rate function
(λ, ǫ, u) 7→
{
H(λ|λ0) if ǫ = u = 0,
∞ otherwise.
The sequences {Mn} and {M
0
n} are exponentially equivalent in the sense that (c.f. [17, 4.2.10])
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P(d¯(Mn,M
0
n) ≥ a) = −∞, for all a > 0, (3.7)
where we define the metric d¯ on P(W) × [0,∞)× [0, 1] by
d¯((λ′, ǫ′, u′), (λ, ǫ, u)) = d(λ, λ′) + |ǫ− ǫ′|+ |u− u′|,
where d is any metric on P(W) compatible with weak convergence. In fact, the probability in
(3.7) is zero for sufficiently large n. Thus, {Mn} satisfies an LDP with the same rate function
[17, Theorem 4.2.13]. Because N is upper hemicontinuous as a set-valued map (by Proposition
3.2), it is continuous as a map from D(N ) to C, equipped with the upper Vietoris topology (see
Lemma A.1). Thus, the contraction principle (see [17, Theorem 4.2.1], which does not actually
need the spaces to be Hausdorff) implies that {N (Mn) = N
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
} satisfies an
LDP on C with good rate function
A 7→ inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), N (λ, 0, 0) = A}
= inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) = A}
= J(A),
where the first equality uses the fact that N (λ, 0, 0) =M(λ) from Remark 3.1(4). 
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Remark 3.7. Recalling from Remark 3.1(4) that N̂n(w1, . . . , wn) = N
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δwi , 0, 1/n
)
,
Theorem 2.7 is an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.6.
Remark 3.8. Because the proof of Theorem 3.6 relies on the contraction principle, a similar
result holds if we weaken the assumptions on the type sequence {Wi}. They need not be i.i.d.,
as long as the sequence of empirical distributions 1n
∑n
i=1 δWi satisfies some LDP.
We next state an extension of Theorem 2.4 and prove it using Theorem 3.6 and some ele-
mentary properties of the upper Vietoris topology. Interestingly, even without uniqueness we
find upper and lower bounds, although they do not match in general.
Theorem 3.9. Use the notation and assumptions of Theorem 3.5, and assume also that W ni =
Wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where {Wi} is an i.i.d. sequence with distribution λ0 ∈ P(W). Then we have
the following bounds, valid for every measurable set A ⊂ P(W ×X ):
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logP(µn ∈ A) ≤ − inf
{
H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ A ∩M
}
, (3.8)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP(µn ∈ A) ≥ − inf{H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ⊂ A
◦}. (3.9)
Moreover, if M(λ) is a singleton for every λ≪ λ0, then
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log P(µn ∈ A) ≥ − inf {H(m
w|λ0) : m ∈ A
◦ ∩M} . (3.10)
Proof. Suppose A is closed. Then U := {E ∈ C : E ⊂ Ac} = {E ∈ C : E ∩A = ∅} is open in the
upper Vietoris topology, so its complement is closed. Thus, using the upper bound of Theorem
3.6,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P
(
N
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
∩A 6= ∅
)
≤ − inf
B∈Uc
J(B)
= − inf
B∈Uc
inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) = B}
= − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ∩A 6= ∅}
= − inf {H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ M∩A} .
Indeed, this last equality follows from two simple observations: If M(λ) ∩ A 6= ∅, then there
exists m ∈ M(λ) ∩ A ⊂ M ∩ A such that mw = λ. On the other hand, if m ∈ M ∩ A, then
m ∈ M(mw), so M(mw) ∩A 6= ∅. Finally, the upper bound (3.8) follows from the inequality
P (µn ∈ A) ≤ P
(
N
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
∩A 6= ∅
)
,
which holds because, by Remark 3.1(4), µn ∈ N
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
a.s.
To prove the lower bound, let A be open, and notice that U = {E ∈ C : E ⊂ A} is open in
the upper Vietoris topology. Theorem 3.6 then implies
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log P
(
N
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
⊂ A
)
≥ − inf
B∈U
J(B)
= − inf
B∈U
inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) = B}
= − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ⊂ A} ,
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where the last equality uses the property that M(λ) is closed for every λ ∈ P(W) (see Propo-
sition 3.2). Then the lower bound (3.9) follows from the inequality
P(µn ∈ A) ≥ P
(
N
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
⊂ A
)
,
which again holds because µn ∈ N
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δWi , ǫn,
1
n
)
a.s.; see Remark 3.1(4).
Finally, we deduce (3.10) from (3.9). Again let A be open and note first that H(λ|λ0) <∞
only if λ ≪ λ0. Supposing M(λ) = {M [λ]} is a singleton for all λ ≪ λ0, then trivially
m =M [mw] for all m ∈ M, and
inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ⊂ A} = inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, M [λ] ∈ A}
= inf {H(mw|λ0) : m ∈M∩A, m
w ≪ λ0}
= inf {H(mw|λ0) : m ∈M∩A} .

In applications, it is important to know if the bounds in the large deviation principles of
Theorems 3.9 and 3.6 are nonzero. The following straightforward lemmas help to check this.
Lemma 3.10. Let J be as in (3.6), and let U ⊂ C be a closed set with M(λ0) /∈ U. Then
infA∈U J(A) > 0.
Proof. Note that
inf
A∈U
J(A) = inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ∈ U} .
Recall that λ 7→ M(λ) = N (λ, 0, 0) ∈ C is continuous by Proposition 3.2 and Lemma A.1.
Hence, the set S = {λ ∈ P(W) : M(λ) ∈ U} is closed because U is. Because λ 7→ H(λ|λ0) is
lower semicontinuous and has compact sub-level sets, there exists λ∗ ∈ S such that H(λ∗|λ0) =
infA∈U J(A). But M(λ
∗) ∈ U implies λ∗ 6= λ0, and thus H(λ
∗|λ0) > 0. 
For our second observation, Lemma 3.12 below, we need the following simple property:
Lemma 3.11. The set M is closed. Moreover, the sub-level set {m ∈ P(W×X ) : H(mw|λ0) ≤
c} is compact for every c <∞.
Proof. Suppose mn ∈ M and m ∈ P(W × X ) with mn → m. Then λn := m
w
n converges to
λ := mw. Then mn ∈ M(λn) = N (λn, 0, 0), and the upper hemicontinuity of N (proven in
Proposition 3.2) implies that the unique limit point m must belong to N (λ, 0, 0) ⊂ M. This
proves that M is closed. The second statement follows because X is compact and the sub-level
set {λ ∈ P(W) : H(λ|λ0) ≤ c} is compact for each c <∞ [18, Lemma 1.4.3(c)]. 
Lemma 3.12. If A ⊂ P(W ×X ) is closed and A∩M(λ0) = ∅, then infm∈A∩MH(m
w|λ0) > 0.
Proof. Since M is closed and the sublevel sets {m : H(mw|λ0) ≤ c} are compact by Lemma
3.11, A ∩M is closed and there exists m∗ ∈ A ∩M such that H(m
w
∗ |λ0) = infm∈A∩MH(λ|λ0).
But A ∩M(λ0) = ∅ implies m
w
∗ 6= λ0, and thus, H(m
w
∗ |λ0) > 0. 
3.5. The conditional limit theorem and entry games. In this section we first prove The-
orem 2.5. Then, to illustrate the tractability of the assumptions, we apply the theorem to an
example from the class of entry games discussed in Section 1.3.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Fix a measurable set A ⊂ P(W ×X ). Since I(A) <∞, the closedness of
M and the compactness of the sub-level sets {m ∈ P(W × X ) : H(mw|λ0) ≤ c} established in
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Lemma 3.11 imply that the set S(A) of minimizers in (2.4) is non-empty and compact. Next,
use the lower bound of Theorem 3.9 to get
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log P (µn ∈ A) ≥ − inf
{
H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ⊂ A
0
}
= −I(A)
= − inf
{
H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), M(λ) ∩A 6= ∅
}
= − inf
{
H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ M∩A
}
,
where we have used the assumption (2.5) in the third line. Because the set
Aǫ := {m ∈ A : d(m,S(A)) ≥ ǫ}
is closed, the upper bound of Theorem 3.9 yields
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P (d(µn, S(A)) ≥ ǫ|µn ∈ A)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P (µn ∈ Aǫ)− lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP (µn ∈ A)
≤ inf
m∈A∩M
H(mw|λ0)− inf
m∈Aǫ∩M
H(mw|λ0)
=: C,
Then clearly C ≤ 0, as A ⊃ Aǫ. If C = 0, then there exists m ∈ Aǫ ∩M such that H(m
w|λ0) =
infm∈A∩MH(m
w|λ0). But this implies m ∈ S(A), which contradicts the fact that S(A) and Aǫ
are disjoint. Thus C < 0, and the proof of (2.6) is complete.
Finally, if M(λ) = {M(λ)} is a singleton for every λ≪ λ0, then the identity (M(λ))
w = λ
implies
inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, M(λ) ⊂ A
◦} = inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, M(λ) ∈ A
◦}
= inf {H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ A
◦ ∩M, mw ≪ λ0}
= inf {H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ A
◦ ∩M} .
Similarly, we noted above already that
I(A) = inf
{
H(λ|λ0) : λ≪ λ0, M(λ) ∩A 6= ∅
}
= inf
{
H(mw|λ0) : m ∈ M∩A
}
.

Let us now consider a simple entry game, specified as follows. There are two types and two
actions, with W = {1, 2} and X = {0, 1}, there are no constraints in this model, so C(w) = X
for all w ∈ W, and the objective function is given by
F (m,w, x) = −x(−3mx{1}+ w),
for m ∈ P(W × X ), w ∈ W, and x ∈ X . Think of each agent as facing a fixed payoff w
from entering the market, i.e., choosing x = 1. This payoff is offset by a loss of 3mx{1} which
increases with the fraction of agents entering the market. If the net payoff is negative, the agent
will choose x = 0 and not enter the market.
For q ∈ [0, 1], let λq = qδ2 + (1 − q)δ1 denote the type distribution in which the fraction of
type-2 agents is q. Of course, {λq : q ∈ [0, 1]} exhausts all of P(W). To apply our conditional
limit theorem, we first characterize all possible Cournot-Nash equilibria:
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Proposition 3.13. For the entry game described above, for each q ∈ [0, 1] the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is unique. That is, M(λq) = {mq}, where mq ∈ P(W ×X ) is defined by
(
mq{(1, 0)} mq{(1, 1)}
mq{(2, 0)} mq{(2, 1)}
)
=

(
2/3 1/3− q
0 q
)
if q ≤ 1/3,(
1− q 0
0 q
)
if 1/3 < q < 2/3,(
1− q 0
q − 2/3 2/3
)
if q ≥ 2/3.
Proof. We know M(λq) 6= ∅ for each q ∈ [0, 1], thanks to Proposition 3.3. Fix q ∈ [0, 1] and
m ∈ M(λq), and abbreviate p = m
x{1}. We will show that m = mq. Note first that
arg min
x∈{0,1}
F (m,w, x) =

{1} if w > 3p,
{0} if w < 3p,
{0, 1} if w = 3p.
Next, there are three cases to check. First, if 3p /∈ {1, 2}, then m{(w, 1)} = 1{w>3p} for each w.
Thus,
p = mx{1} = q1{2>3p} + (1− q)1{1>3p} =

0 if p > 2/3
q if 2/3 > p > 1/3
1 if p < 1/3.
This can only hold if p = q and 1/3 < p < 2/3. For the second case, suppose p = 1/3. Then all
type-2 agents enter since 2 > 3p; that is, m{(2, 1)} = q and m{(2, 0)} = 0. Therefore, we have
1/3 = p = m{(1, 1)} +m{(2, 1)} = m{(1, 1)} + q,
which implies m{(1, 1)} = 1/3 − q, which only makes sense for q ≤ 1/3. For the final case,
suppose p = 2/3. Then type-1 agents do not enter since 1 < 3p; that is, m{(1, 0)} = 1 − q and
m{(1, 1)} = 0. This implies
2/3 = p = m{(1, 1)} +m{(2, 1)} = m{(2, 1)}.
Since q = m{(2, 0)} +m{(2, 1)} = m{(2, 0)} + 2/3, we must have q ≥ 2/3. 
Similarly, in the n-player game, we can argue that there exists a Nash equilibrium with
type vector ~w, for every fixed ~w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n. To construct an example, there are
three cases, depending again on the fraction q of (w1, . . . , wn) which equal 2. In each case, we
construct one example (though there may be more) of an equilibrium, recalling that agent i
enters the market if xi = 1:
(1) Suppose q ∈ [1/3, 2/3]. All type-2 agents enter, while none of the type-1 agents enter.
(2) Suppose q < 1/3. All type-2 agents enter. Let k be the greatest integer less than or
equal to n(1/3− q). Then k of the type-1 agents enter, and the rest do not.
(3) Suppose q > 2/3. All type-1 agents choose not to enter. Let k be the greatest integer
less than or equal to 2/3. Then k of the type-2 agents enter, and the rest do not.
Note that we have constructed multiple equilibria in the latter cases, although they share a
common type-action distribution.
Now that we have computed the Cournot-Nash equilibria and are confident that n-player
equilibria exist, we are ready to apply Theorem 2.5. Now, let µn denote the empirical type-
action distribution as usual, where the types are i.i.d. samples from the distribution λ2/3. That
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is, each of the n agents is independently assigned type 2 with probability 2/3 and type 1 with
probability 1/3. By Theorem 3.5 and Proposition 3.13, we know that µn converges a.s. to the
unique element m2/3 of M(λ2/3). Let us show using Theorem 2.5 that, for r ∈ (1/3, 2/3), if
we condition on the rare event {µxn(1) ≤ r}, then µn → mr. More precisely, the conditional
law of µn converges to the point mass at mr. Intuitively, this rare event means that no more
than a fraction of r of the agents enters the market, and the most likely way for this to happen
(asymptotically) is for precisely a fraction of r of the agents to enter.
Let 1/3 < r < 2/3, and consider the set
A = {m ∈ P(W ×X ) : mx{1} ≤ r} .
We then compute
inf
m∈A∩M
H(mw|λ2/3) = inf
{
H(mwq |λ2/3) : q ∈ [0, 1], mq ∈ A
}
= inf
{
H(λq|λ2/3) : q ∈ [0, r]
}
= inf
{
H(λq|λ2/3) : q ∈ [0, r)
}
= inf
m∈A◦∩M
H(mw|λ2/3),
where the second to last equality holds by continuity of q 7→ H(λq|λ2/3) at q = r. Moreover,
the unique minimizer on the left-hand side is mr, since q 7→ H(λq|λ2/3) is strictly decreasing for
0 < q < 2/3. This shows that the assumption (2.7) of Theorem 2.5 holds, and also that the set
S(A) therein is simply the singleton {mr}.
Remark 3.14. Interestingly, a simple variant of the above game yields a tractable example in
which the Cournot-Nash equilibria are not unique and yet Theorem 2.5 can be applied. For
instance, suppose W = {−1, 1} and X = {0, 1}, with
F (m,w, x) = −x(2mx{1} + w).
Note that there is no minus sign in front of 2mx{1}, so it is not really an entry game; agents
are now encouraged to participate (i.e., choose x = 1) when other agents participate. Setting
m1q(dw, dx) = λq(dw)δ1(dx), it can be checked that m
1
q ∈ M(λq) for each q ∈ [0, 1]; that is, it
is always an equilibrium for every agent to participate. However, there are two (resp. three)
equilibria for q = 1/2 (resp. q < 1/2). Nonetheless, if µn is the empirical type-action distribution
when types are sampled from λp, where p > 1/2, we can find a limit theorem for the law of µn
conditioned on the event {µn ∈ A} where A = {m : m{(−1, 1)} ≤ 1− r}, for r ∈ (p, 1) close to
p. Indeed, we can check that the assumption (2.5) holds, and the unique element of S(A) is mr.
There is even a critical value of r for which (2.5) holds, but S(A) is no longer a singleton. We
omit the details of these calculations, with the remark mainly serving to illustrate the need for
the generality of Theorem 2.5.
3.6. Proof of probabilistic bounds on the price of anarchy. To prove Proposition 2.9, we
rework the notation of Section 2.4 as we did in Section 3.1. Recall the notation Gr(C) = {(w, x) :
x ∈ C(w)}. For (λ, u) belonging to the domain D defined in (3.3), define A(λ, u) ⊂ P(W ×X )
by
A(λ, u) := {m ∈ Eu(W ×X ) : m(Gr(C)) = 1, m
w = λ} ,
Interpret A(λ, u) as the set of admissible type-action distributions. Recall the notation
V (m) =
∫
W×X
F (m,w, x)m(dw, dx),
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for m ∈ P(W ×X ). The price of anarchy is now defined as the function P : D → [1,∞] given
by
P(λ, u) = sup
m∈N (λ,0,u)
V (m)
/
inf
m∈A(λ,u)
V (m).
Lemma 3.15. Suppose V > 0 pointwise. Then P is upper semicontinuous on D.
Proof. First, (λ, u) 7→ supm∈N (λ,0,u) V (m) is upper semicontinuous because V is continuous
and because, by Proposition 3.2, N is upper hemicontinuous and has compact values (see [3,
Lemma 17.30]). It suffices (since V > 0) to show that the denominator infm∈A(λ,u) V (m) is
lower semicontinuous and strictly positive. For both of these claims it suffices to show that
the set-valued map A is upper hemicontinuous and has compact values (again by [3, Lemma
17.30]). To prove this, we again use the sequential characterization of upper hemicontinuity. Fix
a convergent sequence (λn, un)→ (λ, u) in D, and let mn ∈ A(λn, un) for each n. We must show
that there exist m ∈ A(λ, u) and a subsequence {mnk} which converges to m. Because m
w
n = λn,
the sequence {mwn } ⊂ P(W) is tight. Because X is compact, the sequence {mn} ⊂ P(W ×X )
is tight and thus precompact by Prokhorov’s theorem. Let m denote any limit point, and abuse
notation by assuming mn → m.
It remains to show that m belongs to A(λ, u). As Gr(C) is closed, the Portmanteau theorem
implies m(Gr(C)) = limnmn(Gr(C)) = 1. Clearly
mw = lim
n
mwn = limn
λn = λ,
where the limits are in distribution. Finally, to check that m ∈ Eu(W ×X ), there are two cases.
If u = 0, then Eu(W×X ) = P(W ×X ) and there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, un = u for all
sufficiently large n, which implies mn and thus m belong to the closed set Eu(W ×X ). 
Proof of Proposition 2.9. The notation of Proposition 2.9 translates as follows to the present
notation, for n ≥ 1 and w1, . . . , wn ∈ W:
PoAn(w1, . . . , wn) = P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δwi ,
1
n
)
, and PoA(λ) = P(λ, 0).
When (Wi)
∞
i=1 are i.i.d. with distribution λ0, we know that
1
n
∑n
i=1 δWi → λ0 almost surely. By
Lemma 3.15,
lim sup
n→∞
PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) ≤ PoA(λ0), a.s.
To prove the second claim, we apply Sanov’s theorem. Consider the set
B = {(λ, u) ∈ D : P(λ, u) ≥ r} .
Because P is upper semicontinuous on D, the set B is closed in D and thus in P(W) × [0, 1].
By Sanov’s theorem,
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 δWi ,
1
n
)
satisfies an LDP on P(W)× [0, 1] with good rate function
J(λ, u) =
{
H(λ|λ0) if λ ∈ P(W), u = 0,
∞ otherwise.
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Thus, we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
logP(PoAn(W1, . . . ,Wn) ≥ r) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log P
((
1
n
n∑
i=1
δWi ,
1
n
)
∈ B
)
≤ − inf
(λ,u)∈B
J(λ, u)
= − inf {H(λ|λ0) : λ ∈ P(W), PoA(λ) ≥ r} .
To prove the lower bound, simply apply the lower bound of Sanov’s theorem to the set Bc. 
Appendix A. The upper Vietoris topology
For this section, fix a Hausdorff topological space Y, and let C(Y) denote the set of closed
subsets of Y. The upper Vietoris topology on C(Y) is the one generated by the base {E+ :
E ⊂ Y is open}, where we define E+ := {A ∈ C(Y) : A ⊂ E} for sets E ⊂ Y. This section
collects a few basic facts about this topology. First, notice that C(Y) is not Hausdorff, because
if A1 and A2 are two distinct closed subsets of Y with A1 ∩A2 6= ∅, then A1 and A2 cannot be
separated by open sets; indeed, if Ei ⊂ Y is open with Ai ∈ E
+
i for i = 1, 2, then Ai ⊂ Ei, and
A1 ∩A2 ⊂ E1 ∩ E2 implies that E
+
1 and E
+
2 are not disjoint.
Recall from Section 3 the definition of upper hemicontinuity of a set-valued function (with
closed values) between two topological spaces. Namely, if Z is another topological space and
Γ : Z → C(Y), then Γ is upper hemicontinuous if and only if {z ∈ Z : Γ(z) ⊂ E} is open for
every open set E ⊂ Y. Equivalently, Γ is upper hemicontinuous if and only if Γ−1(E+) := {z ∈
Z : Γ(z) ∈ E+} is open for every open set E ⊂ Y. Because {E+ : E ⊂ Y is open} is a base for
the upper Vietoris topology, this immediately proves the following observation:
Lemma A.1. Let Z be another topological space. A mapping Γ : Z → C(Y) is continuous with
respect to the upper Vietoris topology if and only if it is upper hemicontinuous as a set-valued
map.
Lemma A.2. Let g : Y → R, and define G : C(Y) → R by G(A) = supy∈A g(y). If g is upper
semicontinuous, then so is G. If g is continuous, and if A ∈ C(Y) is a compact set such that g
is constant on A (i.e., g(y) = g(y′) for all y, y′ ∈ A), then G is continuous at A.
Proof. The identity map on C(Y) is continuous and thus, by Lemma A.1, can be seen as an
upper hemicontinuous set-valued map. The first claim then follows from [3, Lemma 17.30]. To
prove the second claim, define a set-valued map Γ : C(Y) → 2R by Γ(B) = {g(y) : y ∈ B}.
Then we may write G(B) = supr∈Γ(B) r for every B ∈ C(Y). Because g is continuous, Γ is upper
hemicontinuous [3, Theorem 17.23]. Note Γ(A) = {r0} is a singleton, by assumption.
To prove G is lower semicontinuous at A, suppose Aα is a net in C(Y) converging to A.
Choose arbitrarily rα ∈ Γ(Aα) for each α. By upper hemicontinuity of Γ and compactness of
Γ(A), the net (rα) has a limit point in Γ(A) by [3, Theorem 17.16]. Hence, rα → r0. Thus
lim inf
α
G(Aα) ≥ lim inf
α
rα = r0 = G(A).

Next, we identify the interiors and closures of certain subsets of C(Y). Recall that the interior
of a set is simply the union of its open subsets, and the closure of a set is the intersection of all
closed sets containing it. Take note also that {E+ : E ⊂ Y is open} is a base, and so every open
set in C(Y) can be written as a union of these base elements. In the following lemma, especially
the proof, we will be applying repeated complements, interiors, and + operations, and we prefer
to keep parentheses to a minimum by writing, e.g., Ec ◦+ in place of ((Ec)◦)+.
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Lemma A.3. Let E ⊂ Y be any set, and define
U := {A ∈ C(Y) : A ∩E 6= ∅} = Ec+ c, and
W := {A ∈ C(Y) : A ⊂ E} = E+.
The following hold:
(i) U◦ = W◦ = {A ∈ C(Y) : A ⊂ E◦}. In other words, Ec+ c ◦ = E+ ◦ = E◦+.
(ii) U = W = {A ∈ C(Y) : A ∩ E 6= ∅}. In other words, Ec+ c = E+ = E
c+ c
.
Proof.
(i) Suppose E˜ ⊂ Y is open. Then E˜+ ⊂ U if and only if A ∩ E 6= ∅ for every closed set
A ⊂ E˜. By considering A = {x} for x ∈ E˜ (which is closed because Y is Hausdorff), we
see that E˜+ ⊂ U if and only if E˜ ⊂ E. Thus the interior of U is the union over all sets
E˜+ such that E˜ is open and E˜ ⊂ E, and the largest such set is given by E˜ = E◦. This
shows U◦ = E◦+ = {A ∈ C(Y) : A ⊂ E◦}. To show that W◦ = E◦+, note first that clearly
E◦+ ⊂W◦. On the other hand, if E˜ ⊂ Y is any open set such that E˜+ ⊂W, then A ⊂ E˜
implies A ⊂ E for every closed set A ⊂ Y. Taking A = {x}, we conclude that E˜+ ⊂ W
implies E˜ ⊂ E, which in turn implies E˜ ⊂ E◦ and E˜+ ⊂ E◦+.
(ii) Recall the identities A = Ac ◦ c and A
c
= Ac ◦, valid for any set A in any topological space.
Namely, apply (i) with Ec in place of E to get Ec+ ◦ = Ec ◦+, and thus
U = Ec+ c = Ec+ c c ◦ c = Ec+ ◦ c = Ec ◦+ c = E
c+ c
.
Similarly, apply (i) with Ec in place of E to get E+ c ◦ = Ec c+ c ◦ = Ec ◦+, and thus
W = E+ = E+ c ◦ c = Ec ◦+ c = E
c+ c
.

Appendix B. Nonatomic Congestion games
This section is devoted to existence and uniqueness results for nonatomic congestion games,
namely the proofs of Propositions 2.10 and 2.11.
Proof of Proposition 2.10. For each m, m˜ ∈ P(W), define the directional derivative
Dm˜U(m) :=
d
dǫ
U(m+ ǫ(m˜−m))|ǫ=0.
Noting that ℓe(m) =
∫
1{e∈x}m(dw, dx) for each e ∈ E, we compute
Dm˜U(m) =
∑
e∈E
ce(ℓe(m))
d
dǫ
ℓe(m+ ǫ(m˜−m))|ǫ=0
=
∑
e∈E
ce(ℓe(m))
∫
1{e∈x}(m˜−m)(dw, dx)
=
∫ ∑
e∈x
ce(ℓe(m))(m˜−m)(dw, dx)
=
∫
F (m,x)(m˜−m)(dw, dx).
By definition, m ∈ M(λ) if and only if
∫
F (m,x)(m˜−m)(dw, dx) ≥ 0 for every m˜ ∈ A(λ). On
the other hand, m minimizes U(·) on A(λ) if and only if Dm˜U(m) ≥ 0 for every m˜ ∈ A(λ) 
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Proof of Proposition 2.11. Denote a generic element of T by K = (Ki,j)i,j, where i =
1, . . . , |W| and j = 1, . . . , |X |. Define Uλ : T → R by Uλ(K) = U(mK), where mK ∈ A(λ) is
given by mK{(wi, xj)} = λiKi,j, where λi := λ{wi}. Note that
ℓe(K) := ℓe(mK) =
|W|∑
i=1
|X |∑
j=1
1{e∈xj}λiKi,j.
Then ∂Ki,j ℓe(K) = λi1{e∈xj}, and so
∂Ki,jUλ(K) = ∂Ki,j
∑
e∈E
∫ ℓe(K)
0
ce(s)ds =
∑
e∈E
ce(ℓe(K))λi1{e∈xj},
∂Ki′,j′∂Ki,jUλ(K) =
∑
e∈E
c′e(ℓe(K))λiλi′1{e∈xj}1{e∈xj′}.
Hence, for any T = (Ti,j) ∈ T, we have∑
i,j
∑
i′,j′
Ti,jTi′,j′∂Ki′,j′∂Ki,jUλ(K) =
∑
e∈E
c′e(ℓe(K))
∑
i,j
∑
i′,j′
Ti,jTi′,j′λiλi′1{e∈xj}1{e∈xj′}
=
∑
e∈E
c′e(ℓe(K))
∑
i,j
Ti,jλi1{e∈xj}
2 .
Note that c′e > 0 for each e ∈ E by assumption, and also the squared sum in the last expression is
strictly positive for some e since T 6= 0 belongs to the span of (λi1{e∈xj})i,j by assumption. This
shows that the Hessian of Uλ is positive definite everywhere, and so Uλ has a unique minimizer
on the compact convex set T.

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